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NOTES
intention to seek review under the supervisory jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court. Together with a third alternative, these
possible solutions may be stated as follows:
(1) Notification of intent serves to stay proceedings for
such time as may be reasonably necessary to allow
application to be made.
(2) Notification of intent does not stay proceedings. Only
issuance and service of writs or a stay order on the
trial judge can have that effect.
(3) After notification the trial judge may proceed; however,
he must assume the risk that actions taken after noti-
fication will be nullified if the writs are issued.
It is submitted that mere notification of intent should not
serve to stay proceedings. Only the service of the writs or a stay
order on the trial judge should have that effect. If, in compliance
with the third alternative, the trial judge were allowed to pro-
ceed at his risk, there would always be as a possible consequence
the needless waste of time and effort if proceedings subsequent
to notification were nullified. On the other hand, the result of
the instant case will be to allow a litigant to stay trial court
proceedings merely by giving notice of his intention to apply to
the Supreme Court for review of a ruling by the trial judge.
Clearly, the trial of a case under such circumstances would
become an impossible task if an attorney not averse to the use
of dilatory tactics were allowed to suspend proceedings in this
manner. Although a literal interpretation of the Supreme Court
rule in question supports the position taken in the instant case,
it is believed that this interpretation will prove unworkable
and that reinstatement of the rule of the First National Bank
Bldg. case offers the soundest solution of the problem.
Neilson Jacobs
MINERAL RIGHTS-OBLIGATIONS-POTESTATIVE CONDITION-
DAMAGES FOR FAILURE TO DRILL
Plaintiffs, lessors, sought damages from defendant, lessee, for
an alleged breach of contract to drill. The lease provided: "Lessee
agrees to commence the drilling of a well in search of oil, gas or
other minerals, on the leased premises, on or before one hundred
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and fifty (150) days from date hereof [date of execution], and
to pursue operations and drilling with due diligence to comple-
tion of said well or abandonment thereof as a dry hole." In place
of the usual provision for delay rentals, the parties to the lease
substituted the following proviso: "4. If operations for drilling
are not commenced on said land on or before one hundred fifty
days from this date [date of execution], the lease shall then
terminate." (Italics supplied.) Defendant failed to drill on the
leased premises. Held, complaint dismissed as failing to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendant was not
unconditionally obligated to drill on plaintiffs' land, and plain-
tiffs therefore are not entitled to damages. Failure to drill
resulted in termination of the lease by the terms of the lease
contract. Bland v. Barkalow, 117 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. La. 1953).
The instant case finds ample support in the Louisiana juris-
prudence. A series of decisions, beginning with Fite v. Miller'
and terminating with Godfrey v. Lowery2 are in point. The
Fite case was the first to hold that damages could be recovered
for breach of a contract to drill an oil well. In that case plain-
tiff, who owned a lease on twenty acres of land, had transferred
the north ten acres to defendant. Subsequently, plaintiff and
defendant entered into a contract whereby the former assigned
to the latter a one-half interest in the lease on the remaining
south ten acres. In the words of the court, the consideration for
this contract was $1,000 plus the obligation to drill a well on
both the north and south tracts. Efforts to locate oil on the north
tract having proved futile, defendant refused to drill on the
south tract. Plaintiff thereupon sued for damages for failure to
drill and recovered. The value of the hope of enrichment upon
drilling was used as the measure of damages. The very next
case8 to present the question of damages distinguished the Fite
case and disallowed recovery. The jurisprudence has since con-
sistently veered away from the rule of the Fite case. The prob-
lem of recovery of damages under instruments phrased like those
in the Fite case and the instant case is by no means confined to
Louisiana mineral law.4
The court's interpretation of the lease in the instant case
seems entirely correct. The main purpose of this note is to point
1. 192 La. 229, 187 So. 650 (1939), 13 TULANE L. REV. 639. See also DAGGETT,
MINERAL RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA 395, § 88 (rev. ed. 1949).
2. 223 La. 163, 65 So.2d 124 (1953), 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 434 (1954).
3. Fogel v. Feazel, 201 La. 899, 10 So.2d 695 (1942).
4. See Note, 32 TEXAS L. REv. 127 (1953).
VOL. XIV
NOTES
out that it is possible for a lessor to avoid the results reached
here.
It will not admit of argument that plaintiffs' principal cause
or motive in granting a lease to the defendant was to obtain an
unconditional obligation on the part of defendant to drill on
their land. If this obligation is not obtained, there is an absence
of cause and therefore no contract. 5 Again, it should not admit
of argument that defendant's obligation, which the plaintiffs
were seeking to enforce, was subject to a potestative condition.6
In other words, what appeared at first blush from the written
lease to be an absolute duty to drill turned out to be an illusory
promise.7 This result was doubtless not what the lessor expected.
The solution to the problem is found in careful draftsman-
ship by the lessor's attorney. Form leases are mainly the product
of "lessee interests," and it seems only natural that lessees would
attempt to secure a mineral lease without running any risks
thereunder.8 "Lessor interests" can be adequately protected by
careful attention to the interrelation of the provisions of the
proposed lease. The draftsman must be sure that "unless"
clauses, surrender clauses, separate forfeiture clauses, and other
provisions do not overlap the obligatory provisions of express
covenants so as to deprive them of their binding quality. Without
exercise -of this precaution, the lessor may be without a remedy
for lessee's failure to drill, as were the plaintiffs in the principal,
case.
John S. Covington
TORTS-INTERFERENCE WITH CHILD'S INTEREST
IN NORMAL FILIAL RELATION
Plaintiff, a child, alleged that he had been deprived of his
mother's aid, comfort, kindness, and assistance by defendant's
5. See Arts. 1824-1825, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870. For an excellent discussion
of this topic, see Smith, A Refresher Course in Cause, 12 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 2 (1951).
6. See Arts. 2024-2034, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870. Cases treating this aspect of
a lease are: Lieber v. Ouachita Natural Gas & Oil Co., 153 La. 160, 95 So.
538 (1922); Raines v. Dunson, 145 La. 525, 82 So. 690 (1919); McClendon v.
Busch-Everett Co., 138 La. 722, 70 So. 781 (1916); Caddo Oil & Mining Co. v.
Producers' Oil Co., 134 La. 701, 64 So. 684 (1913).
7. See 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 16, 145, 149 (1950).
8. For an interesting account of how such an attempt backfired, see
Noxon v. Union Oil Co. of California, 210 La. 1074, 29 So.24 67 (1946),
1954]
